Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma irrespective of the opponent's strategy, or else to set the ratio between a ZD player's and their opponent's expected payoff. Here we show that while ZD strategies are weakly dominant, they are not evolutionarily stable and will instead evolve into less coercive strategies. We suggest that ZD strategies with an informational advantage over other players that allows them to recognize other ZD strategies will be evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an advantage is bound to be short-lived as opposing strategies evolve to counteract the recognition.
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game theory | evolution of cooperation | stability E volutionary Game Theory (EGT) has been around for over 30 years, but apparently the theory still has surprises up its sleeve. Recently, Press and Dyson discovered a new class of strategies within the realm of two-player iterated games that allow one player to unilaterally set the opponent's payoff, or else extort the opponent to accept an unequal share of payoffs [1, 2] . This new class of strategies, named "Zero Determinant" or ZD strategies, exploits a curious mathematical property of the expected payoff for a stochastic conditional "memory-one" strategy. In the standard game of EGT called the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), the possible moves are termed "Cooperate" (C) and "Defect" (D), as the original objective of evolutionary game theory was to understand the evolution of cooperation [3] [4] [5] . As opposed to deterministic strategies such as "Always Cooperate" or "Always Defect", stochastic strategies are defined by probabilities to engage in one move or the other. "Memory-one" strategies make their move depending on theirs as well as their opponent's last move: perhaps the most famous of all memory-one strategies within the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game called "Tit-for Tat" plans its moves as a function of only its opponent's last move. Memory-one probabilistic strategies are defined by four probabilities, namely to cooperate given the four possible outcomes of the last play. While probabilistic one-memory iterated games were studied as early as 1990 [6, 7] and more recently by us [8] , the existence of ZD strategies still took the field by surprise.
The mathematical surprise offered up by Press and Dyson concerns the expected payoff to either player, for a game that is iterated infinitely. Such games can be described by a Markov process defined by the four probabilities that characterize each of the two player's strategies [9] (because this is an infinitely repeated game, the probability to engage in the first move-which is unconditional-does not play a role here). Each Markov process has a stationary state given by the left eigenvector of the Markov matrix, which in this case describes the equilibrium of the process. The expected payoff is given by the dot product of the stationary state and the payoff vector of the strategy. But while the stationary state is the same for either player, the payoff vector-given by the score received for each of the four possible plays CC, CD, DC, and DD-is different for the two players for the asymmetric plays CD and DC. Because the expected payoff is a linear function of the payoffs, it is possible for one strategy to enforce the payoff of the opponent by a judiciously chosen set of probabilities that makes the linear combination of determinants vanish (hence the name ZD strategies). Note that this enforcement is asymmetric because of the asymmetry in the payoff vectors introduced earlier: while the ZD player can choose the opponent's payoff to depend only on their own probabilities, the payoff to the ZD player depends on both the ZD player's as well as the opponent's probabilities. This is the mathematical surprise: the expected payoff is usually a very complicated function of six probabilities (and four payoff values, for the four possible plays). When playing against the ZD strategy, the payoff that the opponent reaps is defined by the payoffs and only two remaining probabilities that characterize the ZD strategies.
Let p1, p2, p3, p4 be the probabilities of the ZD player to cooperate given the outcomes CC,CD,DC and DD of the previous encounter, and q1, q2, q3, q4 the probabilities of any other non-ZD strategy (hereafter the "O"-strategy). Given the payoffs (R, S, T, P ) for the four outcomes the payoff to the ZDstrategist opponents is determined entirely by the ZD strategist's probabilities:
while the the ZD strategist's payoff against O
is a complicated function of both ZD's and O's strategy that is too lengthy to write down here [but see the Appendix for the mean payoff given the standard [3] PD values (R, S, T, P ) = (3, 0, 5, 1)]. In Eqs.
(1,2) we adopted the notation of a payoff matrix where the payoff is given to the "row-player". Note that the payoff that the ZD player forces upon its opponent is not necessarily smaller than what the ZD player receives. For example, the payoff for ZD against the strategy "All-D" that defects unconditionally at every move q = (0, 0, 0, 0) is
which is strictly lower than (1) for all games in the realm of the PD parameters.
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Interestingly, a ZD strategist can also extort an unfair share of the payoffs from the opponent, who however could refuse it (turning the game into a version of the Ultimatum Game [10] ). In extortionate games, the strategy being preyed upon can increase their own payoff by modifying their own strategy q, but this only increases the extortionate strategy's payoff. As a consequence, Press and Dyson conclude that a ZD strategy will always dominate any opponent that adapts its own strategy to maximize their payoff, for example by Darwinian evolution [1] . Here we show that ZD strategies (those who fix the opponent's payoff as well as those who extort) are actually evolutionarily unstable, are easily outcompeted by fairly common strategies, and quickly evolve to become non-ZD strategies. However, if ZD strategies can determine who they are playing against (either by recognizing a tag or by analyzing the opponent's response), ZD strategists are likely to be very powerful agents against unwitting opponents.
Methods and Results
In order to determine whether a strategy will succeed in a population, Maynard Smith proposed the concept of an "Evolutionary Stable Strategy" (or ESS) [4] . For a game involving arbitrary strategies I and J, the ESS is easily determined by an inspection of the payoff matrices of the game as follows: I is an ESS if the payoff E(I, I) when playing itself is larger than the payoff E(J, I) between any other strategy J and I, i.e., I is ESS if E(I, I) > E(J, I). In case E(I, I) = E(J, I), then I is an ESS if at the same time E(I, J) > E(J, J). These equations teach us a fundamental lesson in evolutionary biology: it is not sufficient for a strategy to outcompete another strategy in direct competition, rather, it must also play well against itself. The reason for this is that if a strategy plays well against an opponent but reaps less of a benefit competing against itself, then it will be able to invade a population but will quickly have to compete against its own offspring and its rate of expansion slows down. This is even more pronounced in populations with a spatial structure, where offspring are placed predominantly close to the progenitor. If the competing strategy in comparison plays very well against itself, then a strategy that only plays well against an opponent may not even be able to invade.
If we assume that two opponents play a sufficiently large number of games, their payoff approaches the payoff of the Markov stationary state [1, 9] . We can use this mean expected payoff as the payoff to be used in the payoff matrix E that will determine the ESS. For ZD strategies playing O (other) strategies, we know that ZD enforces E(O,ZD)=f ( p) shown in Eq. (1), while ZD receives g( p, q) [Eq. (2)]. But what are the diagonal entries in this matrix? We know that ZD enforces the score (1) regardless of the opponent's strategy, which implies that it also enforces this on another ZD strategist. Thus, E(ZD,ZD)=f ( p). The payoff of O against itself only depends on O's strategy q: E(O,O)=h( q), and is the key variable in the game once the ZD strategy is fixed. The effective payoff matrix then becomes
The payoff matrix of any game can be brought into a normal form with vanishing diagonals without affecting the competitive dynamics of the strategies by subtracting a constant term from each column [11] , so the effective payoff (4) is equivalent to
We notice that the fixed payoff f ( p) has disappeared, and the winner of the competition is determined entirely from the sign of g( p, q)−h( q), as seen by an inspection of the ESS equations. In principle, a mixed strategy (a population mixture of two strategies that are in equilibrium) can be an ESS [4] but this is not possible here precisely because ZD enforces the same score on others as it does on itself.
Evolutionary dynamics of ZD via replicator equations. ZD strategies are defined by setting two of the four probabilities in a strategy to specific values so that the payoff E(O,ZD) depends only on the other two, but not on the strategy O. In Ref. [1] , the authors chose to fix p2 and p3, leaving p1 and p4 to define a family of ZD strategies. The requirement of a vanishing determinant limits the possible values of p1 (the probability to cooperate if in the previous move both players cooperated) to close to 1, while p4 must be near (but not equal to) zero. Let us study an example ZD strategy defined by the values p1 = 0.99 and p4 = 0.01. The results we present do not depend on the choice of the ZD strategy. An inspection of Eq. (1) shows that, if we use the standard payoffs of the Prisoner's Dilemma (R, S, T, P ) = (3, 0, 5, 1), then f ( p) = 2. If we study the strategy "All-D" (always defect, defined by the strategy vector q = (0, 0, 0, 0) as opponent) we find that g( p, q) = 0.75, while h( q) = 1. As a consequence, g( p, q)−h( q) is negative and All-D is the ESS, that is, ZD will lose any evolutionary competition with All-D even though it wins every direct confrontation with All-D. We can check this by following the population fractions as determined by the replicator equations [5, 11, 12] , which describe the frequencies of strategies in a populationπ i = πi(wi −w), [ 6 ] where πi is the population fraction of strategy i, wi is the fitness of strategy i, andw is the average fitness in the population. In our case, the fitness of strategy i is the mean payoff for this strategy, so
andw = πZDwZD + πOwO. We show πZD and π AllD (with πZD + π AllD = 1) in Fig. 1 as a function of time for different initial conditions, and confirm that All-D drives ZD to extinction regardless of initial concentration. Evolutionary dynamics of ZD in agent-based simulations. It could be argued that an analysis of evolutionary stability within the replicator equations ignores the complex game play that occurs in populations where the payoff is determined in each game, and where two strategies meet by chance and survive based on their accumulated fitness. We can test this by following ZD strategies in an agent-based simulation with a fixed population size of Npop = 16, 384 agents, a fixed replacement rate of 1% (one percent of the population is replaced by offspring every update, leading to overlapping generations), and using a fitness-proportional selection scheme (a deathbirth Moran process). Details of the simulation implementation are as published earlier in Ref. [13] . To test whether the full agent-based dynamic agrees with the replicator equation, we now study the competition of ZD with a fully stochastic (but defecting) strategy that we evolved earlier [8] . This strategy, which we call SD (for "stochastic defector") predominantly defects but attempts to cooperate if both players cooperated in the previous game, and is given by the strategy q = (0.534, 0.296, 0.063, 0.053). This strategy gives rise to the stationary payoffs h( q) = 1.211 and g( p, q) = 1.022 [f ( q) = 2 as before]. Because g( p, q) − h( q) is negative, SD should outcompete ZD.
In Fig. 2 , we show the population fractions πZD and πSD for two different initial conditions [πZD(0) = 0.4 and 0.6], using a full agent-based simulation (solid lines) or using the replicator equations (dotted lines). While the trajectories differ in detail (likely because in the agent-based simulations generations overlap, the number of encounters is not infinite but dictated by the replacement rate, and payoffs are accumulated over ten opponents randomly chosen from the population), the dynamics are qualitatively the same. This can also be shown for any other stochastic strategy q. Note that in the agent-based simulations, strategies have to play the first move unconditionally, which we have set to pC = 0.5 for both SD and ZD.
Agent-based simulations thus corroborate what the replicator equations have already told us, namely that ZD strategies have a hard time surviving in populations because they suffer from the same low payoff that they impose on other strategies if faced with their own kind. However, ZD can win some battles, in particular against strategies that cooperate. For example, the stochastic cooperator GC ("general cooperator", defined by p = (0.935, 0.229, 0.266, 0.42) is the evolutionary dominating strategy evolved at low mutation rates in Ref. [8] . GC is a cooperator that is very generous, cooperating after mutual defection almost half the time. GC loses out (in the evolutionary sense) against ZD because E(Z,GC)=2.125 while E(GC,GC)=2.11, and ZD certainly wins (again in the evolutionary sense) against the unconditional deterministic strategy "All-C" that always cooperates [see Eq. (12) Mutational instability of ZD strategies. To test how ZD fares in an experiment where strategies can evolve (in the previous sections, we only considered the competition between strategies that are fixed), we ran evolutionary (agent-based) simulations in which strategies are encoded genetically. The genome itself evolves via random mutation and fitness-proportional selection. For stochastic strategies, the probabilities are encoded in 5 genes (one unconditional and four conditional probabilities drawn from a uniform distribution when mutated) and evolved as described in detail in Ref. [8] . Rather than starting the evolution experiments with random strategies, we seeded them with the particular ZD strategy we have discussed here (p1 = 0.99 and p4 = 0.01). These experiments show that when we use a mutation rate that favors the strategy GC as the fixed point, ZD evolves into it even though ZD outcompetes GC at zero mutation rate as we saw in the previous section. In Fig. 3 , we show the four probabilities that define a strategy over the evolutionary line of descent, followed over 50,000 updates of the population (with a replacement rate of 1%, this translates on average to 500 generations). The evolutionary line of descent (LOD) is created by taking one of the final genotypes that arose in the experiment, and following its ancestry backwards mutation by mutation, to arrive at the ZD ancestor used to seed the experiment [14] . (Because of the competitive exclusion principle [15] , the individual LODs of all the final genotypes collapse to a single LOD with a fairly recent common ancestor). The LOD recapitulates the evolutionary unfolding that has taken place, and confirms what we had found earlier [8] , namely that the evolutionary fixed points are independent of the starting strategy and simply reflect the optimal strategy given the amount of noise in the environment. We thus conclude that ZD is unstable in another sense (besides not being an ESS): it is genetically or mutationally unstable, as mutations of ZD are likely not ZD, and we have shown earlier that ZD generally does not do well against other strategies that defect but are not ZD themselves. Stability of extortionate ZD strategies. Extortionate ZD strategies ("ZDe" strategies) are those that set the ratio of the ZD strategist's payoff against a non-ZD strategy [1] rather than setting the opponent's absolute payoff. Against a ZDe strategy, all the opponent can do (in a direct matchup) is to increase their own payoff by optimizing their strategy, but as this increases ZDe's payoff commensurately, the ratio (set by an extortion factor χ, where χ = 1 represents a fair game) remains the same. Press and Dyson show that for ZDe strategies with extortion factor χ, the payoffs are
E(ZDe, O) = 2 + 13χ 2 + 3χ , [ 10 ] which implies that E(ZDe, O) > E(O, ZDe) for all χ > 1. However, ZDe plays terribly against other ZDe strategies, who are defined by a set of probabilities given in Ref. [1] . Notably, ZDe strategies have p4 = 0, that is, they never cooperate after both opponents defect. It is easy to show that for p4 = 0, the mean payoff E(ZDe, ZDe) = P , that is, the payoff for mutual defection. As a consequence ZDe can never be an ESS as E(O, ZDe) > E(ZDe, ZDe) for all finite χ ≥ 1, except when χ → ∞, where ZDe can be ESS along with an opponent's strategy that has a mean payoff E(O, O) not larger than P . Given that ZD and ZDe are evolutionary unstable against a large fraction of stochastic strategies, is there no value to this strategy then? We will argue below that strategies that play ZD against non-ZD strategies but a different strategy (for example cooperation) against themselves, may very well be highly fit in the evolutionary sense, and emerge in appropriate evolution experiments.
ZD strategies that can recognize other players. Clearly, winning against your opponents isn't everything if this impairs the payoff against similar or identical strategies. But what if a strategy could recognize who they play against, and switch strategies depending on the nature of the opponent? For example, such a strategy would play ZD against others, but cooperate with other ZD strategists instead. It is in principle possible to design strategies that use a (public or secret) tag to decide between strategies. Riolo et al. [16] designed a game where agents could donate costly resources only to players that were sufficiently similar to them (given a tag). This was later abstracted into a model in which players can use different payoff matrices (such as those for the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Stag-Hunt game) depending on the tag of the opponent [17] . Recognizing another player's identity can in principle be accomplished in two ways: the players can simply record an opponent's tag and select a strategy accordingly [18] , or they can try to recognize a strategy by probing the opponent with particular plays. When using tags, it is possible that players cheat by imitating the tag of the opponent [19] (in that case it is necessary for players to agree on a new tag so that they can continue to reliably recognize each other). Tag-based recognition is used to enhance cooperation among animals via the so-called "green-beard" effect [20, 21] , and can give rise to cycles between mutualism and altruism [22] . Recognizing a strategy from behavior is discussed below. Note that whether a player's strategy is identified by a tag or learned from interaction, in both cases it is communication that enables cooperation [8] .
A shortest-memory player is unstable against longer-memory players. In order to recognize a player's strategy via its actions, it is necessary to be able to send complex sequences of plays, and react conditionally on the opponent's actions. In order to be able to do this, a strategy must be able to use more than just the previous plays (memory-one strategy). This appears to contradict the conclusion reached in [1] that the shortestmemory player sets the rule of the game. This conclusion was reached by correctly noting that in a direct competition of a long-memory player and a short-memory player, the payoff to both players is unchanged if the longer memory player uses a "marginalized" short-memory strategy. However, as we have seen earlier, in an evolutionary setting it is necessary to not only take cross-strategy competitions into account, but also how the strategies fare when playing against themselves, that is, like-strategies. Then, it is clear that a long-memory strategy will be able to recognize itself (simply by noting that the responses are incompatible with a "marginal" strategy) and therefore distinguish itself from others. Thus, it appears possible that evolutionarily successful ZD strategies can be designed that use longer memories to distinguish self from non-self. Of course, such a strategy will be vulnerable to mutated strategies that look sufficiently like a ZD player to fool it, but subtly exploit it instead.
Discussion
ZD strategies are a new class of conditional stochastic strategies for the iterated PD (and likely other games as well) that are able to unilaterally set an opponent's payoff, or else set the ratio of payoffs between the ZD strategist and its opponent. The existence of such strategies is surprising, but they are not evolutionarily (or even mutationally) stable in adapting populations. Evolutionary stability can be determined by using the steady-state payoffs of two players engaged in an unlimited encounter as the one-shot payoff matrix between these strategies. Maynard Smith's standard ESS conditions applied to that payoff matrix shows that while ZD strategies are weakly dominant (their payoff against self is equal to what any other strategy receives playing against them) it is the opposing strategy that is often the ESS. (ZDe strategies are not even weakly dominant, except for the limiting case χ → ∞.) While this argument relies on using the steady-state payoffs, it turns out that an agent-based simulation with finite iterated games reproduces those results almost exactly. Furthermore, ZD strategies are mutationally unstable even when they are the ESS at zero mutation rate, because the proliferation of ZD mutants that are not exactly ZD creates an insurmountable obstacle to the evolutionary establishment of ZD, which instead evolves into a harmless cooperating or defecting strategy (depending on the mutation rate, see [8] ).
For ZD strategists to stably and reliably outcompete other strategies, they have to have an informational advantage. This "extra information" can be obtained by using a tag to recognize each other and conditionally cooperate or play ZD depending on this tag, or by having a longer-memory strategy that a player can use to prove the opponent's play. Of course, such an information-based dominance is itself vulnerable to the evolution of interfering mechanisms by the exploited strategies, either by imitating the tag (and thus destroying the information channel) or by evolving longer memories themselves. Needless to say, this type of evolutionary arms race has been, and will be, observed throughout the biosphere.
